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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have recently developed evolutionary models that have improved
our understanding of the economic efficiency of the common law." These mod-
els describe the conditions under which inefficient rules of law are apt to be
relitigated and overturned. The most recent explication of the theory main-
tains that the common law will be driven toward efficient rules only where the
parties to a particular case represent symmetrically all future interests in dis-
putes of the same nature.
* Professor of Economics, University of Florida; B.A., 1964; M.A., 1966; Ph.D.,
1968, Michigan State University.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Florida; B.A., 1968,
Northwestern University; M.A., 1969; J.D., 1975, Stanford University. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the research support provided by the Public Policy Research
Center at the University of Florida.
1. The theory that the common law precedent promotes efficient exchange in
the market has been debated vigorously in the legal and economic literature. See, e.g.,
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 404 (2d ed. 1977); Goodman, An Economic
Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Landes
& Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981);
Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979);
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977); see also Cooter & Kornhouser, Can Litigation Improve The Law Without the
Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Hirschleifer, Evolutionary Models in
Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, 4 REs. L. & ECON. 1
(1982). Critics of the theory and of the debate include Epstein, The Social Conse-
quences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982), and Michelman, A
Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 309
(1979). Judge (then Professor) Posner responded to these criticisms in Posner, The
Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243
(1980) and Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the
Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981).
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Symmetry occurs when each party expects to be involved in similar cases
in the future, and, therefore, each has an interest in precedent. When either
party lacks an interest in the precedent that the case creates, the common law
tends to develop in favor of the party with a continuing interest in cases of the
same sort, irrespective of whether the resulting rules are economically effi-
cient.2 This may result from spending in litigation that is disproportionate to
the amount at stake in the case. 3 Alternatively, it may result from the ten-
dency of the litigant with the continuing interest to adopt strategies in litiga-
tion that place greater emphasis on the development of legal principle.4 Fi-
nally, it may result from the tendency of the party with an ongoing interest to
selectively settle, litigate, and appeal cases, and to use techniques afforded by
the judicial process for obtaining favorable precedent and avoiding unfavora-
ble precedent.5
The efficiency of statutory rules of lawhas been examined as well. Profes-
sor Rubin has suggested that the common law and legislatures may be equally
efficient in making law.' If an effective lobbying group has an ongoing interest
in a particular side of future disputes, the resulting legislation will bear no
predictable relationship to economically efficient rules of liability.
Whether the common law or statutes produce more efficient results varies
with the symmetry of the parties' continuing interests in a rule and the extent
to which the courts will uphold attempts to alter the effect of the rule. So, for
example, where parties have a contract that the courts will enforce, they will
alter the effect of inefficient rules of liability-common law or statu-
tory-through contractual provisions. 8 Where the parties have no contractual
relationship, but represent symmetrically all future interests in similar dis-
putes, there should be incentives for the interest groups to press for legislation,
or the parties to a dispute to litigate, toward efficient rules of liability. Where
the parties have no contractual relationship and they represent asymmetrically
the future interests in similar disputes, the law, whether judge-made or statu-
tory, should evolve in favor of the party with an ongoing interest in a particu-
2. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 55.
3. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 402.
4. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 55-56.
5. See Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 212
(1982).
[D]isputants who are in the market will tend to litigate until they reach a
favorable decision. They may achieve such a decision by spending more on
litigation; by relitigating cases whenever issues arise until a favorable decision
is reached; by waiting to litigate until a particularly apt case for establishing
precedent occurs; and by using other techniques aimed at obtaining favorable
precedents. ...
Id.; see also Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc. REv. 95 (1974).
6. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 207.
7. See id. at 213.
8. So long as courts will enforce contract provisions that alter the effect of the
common law or statutory rule, the form of the law is almost irrelevant. Id. at 214.
290 [Vol. 49
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lar rule. In this event, there will be no predictable connection with efficiency.
Rubin has suggested that parties with an ongoing interest in the rules
tend to turn to legislation when further litigation will be unlikely to change an
adverse rule.' Professor Epstein has asserted more broadly that as the stakes
in repetitive disputes become higher, the parties recognize that the changes
that can be achieved through the common law are limited.10 As a result, they
turn to the legislative arena to effect changes in the rules. Epstein advanced
this hypothesis as part of his argument that observers should be cautious in
attributing major social and economic consequences to common law rules. This
hypothesis is apparently consistent with Rubin's analysis of the predictable
efficiency of the common law and statute law.
The law's treatment of injury in the consumer credit reporting context"1
provides an excellent example of Rubin's hypothesis. The injury occurs when a
credit agency reports inaccurate information about a consumer to a potential
creditor, insurer, or employer. Prior to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), 2 state common law treated the injury as a defamation,' 3 usually
clothing the agency with a qualified privilege to defame. In 1970, the FCRA
supplanted the state law of defamation.' 4 Congress addressed the problem of
injury to consumers by mandating certain behavior of credit reporting agen-
cies and by creating a statutory cause of action in negligence for failure to
maintain reasonable procedures for assuring accuracy in credit information.
The common law action remained relatively stable from the late nineteenth
century to 1970, when the FCRA effectively barred the action and substituted
a statutory action. The common law action and the statutory action are suffi-
ciently distinct that they can be described and compared within Rubin's theo-
retical framework.
9. Id. at 213.
10. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1717, 1720 (1982).
11. This Article addresses injury to consumers in the credit reporting context in
order to confine the example to a reasonably consistent pattern. Common law defama-
tion cases governing injury to reputation by credit reporting agencies made no apparent
distinction between injuries to consumers and injuries to businesses. The Fair Credit
Reporting Act protects consumers. A "consumer" is defined as "an individual." 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(b) (1982).
12. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
.1681-1681t (1982)).
13. Defamation has been defined as an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in rep-
utation and good name by a communication to a third party which affects the commu-
nity's opinion of him. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737
(4th ed. 1971). The Restatement of Torts describes a communication as defamatory "if
it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1982); notes 94-97 and accompanying text infra;
see also Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72
GEO. L.J. 95 (1983) (comparison of the common law and statutory actions).
1984]
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF ACCURACY IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTING
Consumer credit reporting agencies collect and disseminate information
as a service to their subscribers, who are usually creditors, employers, and
insurers.1 5 The subscribers normally contract to receive this service and to pro-
vide the agency with information regarding their experience with individuals.
Thus, when an individual applies for credit, a job, or insurance, the creditor,
employer, or insurer may turn to a reporting agency for a standard credit
report on the applicant. In many cases, the credit report is used simply to
corroborate information solicited from the applicant.
The information typically reported to subscribers by the agency relates to
identification, length of residence, length and place of employment, public
records of judgments against the subject, and information about the subject's
credit history.1 6 Credit history information, which is gathered largely from
subscribers, includes the identities' of past creditors, the type of account, the
credit extended to the subject, the amount owing, amounts past due, and any
late payment history.17 Creditors use consumer reports to assess the default
risks in dealing with a prospective debtor. Employers use the information to
predict the stability and reliability of prospective employees. Insurers use the
information to verify applications and to predict the extent of the insurance
risk. Subscribers who want more detailed or more extensive information than
that provided in the standard credit report may obtain an investigative con-
sumer report. 18 To produce an investigative consumer report, the agency
makes inquiries of neighbors and associates regarding the moral reputation,
drinking habits, sexual preferences, lifestyle, and other personal characteristics
of the subject.19
15. See Note, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State
Action, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 421, 426-38 (1975); Note, Credit Investigations and the
Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509, 510-11 (1969).
16. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN IN-
FORMATION SOCIETY 56-57 (1977).
17. Id.
18. Under the FCRA, an "investigative consumer report" is a report "in which
information on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living is obtained through personal interviews." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (1982).
Investigative reporting is a specialized area of consumer reporting, and the greatest
domestic share of these reports is produced by a single firm. See Hearings on S.1840
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 290-95 (1975); The Georgia Fact-Finder, NA-
TION's Bus., Dec. 1978, at 41-44.
19. Report subjects and commentators charge that investigators lack incentives
to produce accurate and unbiased reports. See Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, 383 F.
Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (thirty minutes spent to assemble personally damag-
ing credit report), af'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976). For comment on the potential
damage to reputation and privacy posed by investigative credit reports, see McLaughlin
& Vaupel, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little
Brother is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773 (1975); Note, Protecting The
Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035 (1971).
292 [Vol. 49
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At first blush, one would assume that the provision of accurate informa-
tion would be important to everyone involved. The subscribers should want
accurate information to help assess the risks that they face. Presumably, the
credit reporting agency that provides the most accurate and complete informa-
tion will get most of the business. Finally, most individuals are reasonably
good risks and they will prefer informational accuracy. Only those who are
bad risks will prefer inaccuracy and then only if the error favors their
application.
This happy state of affairs ignores the fact that errors are apt to occur in
collecting and disseminating information. It also ignores the nature of the de-
cision process and the role that information plays. Consider the problem faced
by a creditor in assessing the default risk associated with extending a loan to a
particular individual. The creditor cannot get information on whether the ap-
plicant will default on the loan in question. The information in the credit re-
port does not answer this question. Instead, it provides signals2° that the credi-
tor can use to infer the likelihood of default or slow payment. The link
between these signals and actual experience is necessarily imperfect, 2' and this
imperfection affects the incentives for providing accurate information.
For the loan officer, there may be a certain degree of risk aversion22 due
to the asymmetric impact of error on his part. If he approves a loan and the
borrower defaults, his superior will know that a mistake was made and take
that into account in evaluating his performance. If the loan officer fails to
make a loan to a prospective borrower who would not have defaulted, no one
will know. 23 The optimal default rate is not zero because too many profitable
loan applications will have to be rejected to achieve a zero default rate. 4
Nonetheless, one should expect the loan officer to prefer to commit the second
sort of error.
For the credit reporting agency, reporting false negative information will
lead to undetectable errors because the errors take the form of safe loans not
20. See A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 76-87 (1974) (signals and the transfer
of information in screening processes).
21. A signal is unlikely to be perfectly correlated with actual experience. For
example, although the public takes a lawyer's admission to the bar as a signal of com-
petence, some lawyers are incompetent.
22. A risk averter will refuse all actuarially fair gambles and even pay some-
thing to avoid risk. This payment can take the form of a lower average income with
less variation rather than an actual market transaction. In other instances, it may take
the form of buying insurance. See K. ARROW, THEORY OF RISK BEARING 90-109
(1971).
23. This is a clear example of the difficulties inherent in monitoring the per-
formance of subordinates. For a discussion of monitoring in a variety of contexts, see
R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, MICROECONOMics FOR MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 244-
47, 272-75, 385-90 (1982).
24. The optimal default rate for the maximization of expected profit is found by
accepting higher risks of default until the increment in total revenue is just equal to the
increment in the expected cost of the loan, including the expected loss due to default.
19841
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made. In contrast, reporting false positive information will lead to loan approv-
als that are more likely to result in defaults. These will be detected immedi-
ately. The fact that an error was made by the agency will not be obvious, but
the loss will be. As subscribers have cumulative bad luck with this sort of
report, the agency will begin to lose business; the market will discipline the
agency that produces too many false positive reports.
The agency and its subscribers have a continuing interest in the credit
information enterprise. In providing information, errors will be made. The risk
of error can be allocated between the agency and its subscribers through the
service contract.29 The competitive market and the service contract ought to
generate a level of accuracy in the information transfer that is acceptable, at
the contract price, to both parties.2 Both parties, however, will probably pre-
fer to avoid false positive reports more than false negative reports. A false
positive report may cause subscribers to expend resources and undertake costs
of doing business with a subject, which can result in out-of-pocket losses. If
perfect information cannot be produced and sold at a price the subscribers are
willing to pay,17 the subscribers and the agency should prefer error on the side
of producing false negative reports. The bias in the type of error is not without
cost to the subscriber because of the resulting opportunity losses, but risk aver-
sion may lead the individuals within the firm to prefer opportunity losses that
are hard to detect.
There is evidence in the case law28 and in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's investigations into the credit reporting industry29 that agencies produce
25. See generally Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and
the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossi-
bility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83 (1977).
26. If the market is not competitive, one party can exploit its market power to
the detriment of the other. For an analysis of contract terms that recognizes the role of
competition in the market, see Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
27. Ordinarily, perfect information is not optimal because information is costly
to produce and transmit. A decision maker will increase his or her information set until
the incremental value of further information is equal to the incremental cost of ob-
taining the extra information.
28. See, e.g., Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
29. Following an extensive investigation of the practices of Equifax, Inc., a ma-jor credit reporting agency, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint alleging
that Equifax's practice of rewarding investigators for the production of negative infor-
mation violated the FCRA. In 1977, the administrative law judge found for the FTC.
Equifax, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 844, 1034 (1980). In December, 1980, the FTC ordered
Equifax to cease pressuring investigators to produce negative information. Equifax,
Inc., 96 F.T.C. 844, 1035-36 (1980), rev'd in part, 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982).
The theory of the FTC's decision was that pressure to produce adverse information
increased the likelihood of employees falsifying negative information. The Eleventh
Circuit set aside part of the FTC's order on the ground that the evidence produced in
the investigation did not warrant the inference that Equifax's practice posed an unrea-
sonable risk of inaccuracy. Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 49
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss2/3
CREDIT REPORTING
a set level of negative information as a structural feature of their service, even
though that tends to increase the incidence of false negative reports. It is rea-
sonable to assume that this practice is known to agencies and users alike and
that it is a response to market pressure by users to avoid false positive infor-
mation. No doubt, this is privately optimal; the economic interaction between
the credit reporting agency and its subscribers will result in the privately opti-
mal degree of accuracy. An agency will improve the accuracy of its report
until the cost of additional accuracy is just equal to the added value of the
report, as measured by the subscriber's willingness to pay.30 Since the credit
reporting agency will consider the private costs and benefits of greater accu-
racy, the privately optimal degree of accuracy will be produced.
The subject of the credit information report is not represented in this de-
cision process.31 The potential consequences are serious for the individual who
is injured by the mistake or accident. False negative reports may result in an
inability to obtain credit, employment, or insurance. Since these external
costs32 of a false negative report are ignored by the producer, the accuracy of
the report will not be socially optimal. This social harm will continue as long
as the subject's interests are ignored.
It is useful to think of a false negative report issued by a credit reporting
agency as an accident with two victims: the agency's subscriber and the sub-
ject of the false negative report. Both suffer costs, but the subscriber's accident
costs are considered in the agency's decision calculus. The subject of the false
negative report is like an innocent bystander. A rule of liability that forces the
contracting parties to recognize the costs imposed upon the subject is needed
for social optimality.
A simple negligence standard of liability requires that the credit reporting
agency improve the accuracy of its reports as long as the cost of doing so is
less than the expected accident cost that would be avoided.33 The expected
30. An agency that failed to do this would not maximize its profits. Economists
usually assume that firms attempt to maximize profit. See, e.g., R. BLAIR & L. KENNY,
supra note 23, ch. 1.
31. For a discussion of social optimality when the adverse effects on third par-
ties are not considered in the firm's decision calculus, see Buchanan & Stubblebine,
Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
32. When a transaction between two parties has a deleterious effect upon a
third party, it is said to have an external cost. Economic remedies for external costs
involve procedures to internalize them. These costs were first analyzed in Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
33. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge
Hand expressed what has become a classic standard of fault in negligence: the court
should consider the magnitude of the loss if an accident occurs, discounted by the
probability of the accident occurring. Id. at 173. If the product exceeds the burden of
taking precaution to avoid the accident, the defendant should be found negligent. If the
cost of avoidance exceeded the product, the defendant should not be held accountable.
The negligence standard requires taking only cost-justified precaution. From this for-
mulation has developed the theory that the fault system of liability should produce
rules that bring about efficient levels of accidents. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negli-
1984]
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accident costs will include those of the subject, not just those of the subscriber.
The negligence standard will lead to more accurate reports and fewer accident
costs. Since greater accuracy will lead to higher costs for the agency, the price
of the agency's service will rise and fewer credit reports will be purchased.
Some accident costs will persist because the optimal accident rate is not zero.
From the subscriber's perspective, the improved accuracy is not worth the
increased cost.3 4 From the subject's perspective, the accuracy is still inade-
quate because the expected accident costs are still positive. Since the subject
does not pay the agency directly for improved accuracy, the subject will de-
mand greater accuracy. The subject pays for the greater accuracy indirectly
through higher costs for credit and insurance as the higher prices for credit
reports are passed on to the subscribers' customers.
A standard of strict liability makes the credit reporting agency responsi-
ble for the accident costs imposed upon subjects without regard to whether the
agency had taken cost-justified precautions to avoid the injury.35 As a result,
the accuracy of the reports should be the same as under a negligence standard.
When a cost-justified improvement in accuracy is possible, the agency will em-
brace the opportunity just as it would under the simple negligence standard.
The major change that will occur involves a wealth transfer from the agency
to the subject of a false negative report. The residual expected accident costs
will not be borne by the subject as they would under a negligence standard.
Instead, they would be borne by the credit reporting agency. This would fur-
ther increase the price of credit reports and reduce the quantity purchased at
the margin. In turn, the costs will be reflected in the price of credit and insur-
ance to the consumer.
Simple negligence and strict liability 6 would be improvements over a rule
eliminating liability for publishing false negative credit reports. As far as the
allocation of resources to improved accuracy is concerned, there is no differ-
ence between these two standards. Simple negligence and strict liability result
in the same degree of accuracy. The difference between the two resides in the
resulting wealth distribution. Under simple negligence, the subject of the re-
port bears some expected accident costs that will not be compensated because
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); cf. Epstein; Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of
Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence
and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980).
34. If it were worth the increased cost, the agency would have improved the
accuracy without the threat of a negligence action.
35. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 137-42.
36. Neither contributory nor comparative negligence appears to be a useful con-
cept in this context. The subject is a third party-an innocent bystander-who plays no
role in the whole affair. He cannot take actions to mitigate his injury except to refrain
from applying for credit, insurance, or employment.
[Vol. 49
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the agencies will choose not to be negligent. The strict liability standard, in
contrast, will fully compensate the accident victims and the agencies will bear
the costs. In the credit reporting situation, there is another effect: the expected
accident costs will be reflected in the prices paid by the agency's subscribers.
Thus, subscribers will recognize some social costs that would be ignored under
the negligence standard. Accordingly, a standard of strict liability should be
preferred as better protecting subjects.
The rule of liability that actually will emerge has significance for social
welfare and wealth distribution. As a result, the agency, its subscribers, and
subjects have conflicting interests in the rules that govern the allocation of the
risk of harm. These conflicting interests provide a test of Rubin's evolutionary
theory.
III. THE COMMON LAW
Prior to the FCRA, the victim of a false credit report had to rely upon a
common law theory of action. The principal legal theory available was a tort
action for defamation. The heart of the defamation action is that the defen-
dant has invaded the plaintiff's reputation and good name by a communication
to a third party that affects the community's opinion of him.37 Communication
that deters third parties from associating or dealing with the plaintiff also may
be the basis for a defamation action.38
In the classic American common law defamation case, the plaintiff
needed to show that the defendant published 9 defamatory matter"0 concerning
the plaintiff4 that was understood by the recipient to be defamatory. 42 The
plaintiff was then entitled to a verdict unless the defendant asserted and
proved an affirmative defense.43 The principal defenses44 were truth 5 and priv-
37. See note 13 supra. "Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and
slander-the one being, in general, written, while the other in general is oral. . .. In
either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name." W.
PROSSER, supra note 13, § 111, at 737.
38. A communication is defamatory if "it tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1976).
39. The defamation must be communicated to someone other than the person
defamed. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 113, at 766.
40. Id. § 111, at 739 ("Defamation is . . . that which tends to injure 'reputa-
tion' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in
which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or
opinions against him.").
41. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10, at 50-64 (1978); W.
PROSSER, supra note 13, § 111, at 744-46.
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 746-48. It is not necessary that the words
were believed by the recipient or that the language took any particular form. Id. at
746; see L. ELDREDGE, supra note 41, § 7, at 31-41.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 582-592A (1977); L. ELDREDGE,
1984]
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ilege . The plaintiff was not required to prove falsity; the defendant had the
burden of pleading and proving truth as a defense.4 7 If the defendant showed a
prima facie case of a qualified privilege to defame, however, the plaintiff as-
sumed the burden of proving that the defendant abused the privilege48 and
that the plaintiff had in fact sustained injury. 9 To overcome the qualified priv-
supra note 41, § 6, at 25; W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 114, at 776.
44. One general class of legal defenses includes consent, truth, and other abso-
lute privileges, which confer complete immunity from civil liability. The other class
includes the conditional privileges, which may constitute a complete defense. L. EL-
DREDGE, supra note 41, at 315-16. The factual defenses are that the defendant never
published the words, the words were not "of and concerning" the plaintiff, or the words
did not bear and were not understood to bear defamatory meaning. Id. at 315. Special
defenses to slander include that the words are not actionable without special damages
and none are alleged, the publication is not the proximate cause of the damage, the
words were not calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office, profession, calling,
trade, or business, or the words were merely vulgar abuse or spoken in heat. Id. (citing
C. GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 165 (6th ed. 1967)).
45. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 582 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581A (1977).
46. There are absolute and conditional privileges to defame. The principal abso-
lute privileges apply to statements made in the course of judicial, legislative, and execu-
tive proceedings. A spouse is immune with respect to defamatory matter published to
the other spouse. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 41, § 72, at 340. The conditional privileges
are numerous and varied. The policy behind conditional privileges recognizes that true
information must be given when it is reasonably necessary for the protection of one's
own interests, the interests of third persons, or certain interests of the public. In order
that the information may be freely given, it is necessary to protect against liability for
misinformation given in an appropriate effort to protect or advance an interest. Other-
wise, true information that should be given or received would not be communicated
because of fear of defamation liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 com-
ment d (1977). "One who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable
for the publication if (a) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it condi-
tionally privileged and (b) the privilege is not abused." Id. § 593.
Beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme
Court has conferred a qualified first amendment-based privilege to defame, at least to
protect the press and possibly nonmedia defendants. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis
Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1966); see also Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media
Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978); Note,
Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to
Nonmedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1876 (1982). A "private" person defamed
by the press may be compensated under state defamation law if the standard of liabil-
ity requires a showing of fault at least as great as negligence. Compensation may not
include presumed or punitive damages unless liability is based on a showing of fault or
reckless disregard of the truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
47. See W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 116, at 798 ("[T]he law presumes in the
first instance that all defamation is false, and the defendant has the burden of pleading
and proving its truth."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 comment f(1979); L. ELDREDGE, supra note 41, §§ 63-65, at 323-31.
48. See W. PROSSER, supra'note 13, § 115, at 796.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569, 570 (1981); L. ELDREDGE,
supra note 41, § 95, at 537-41.
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ilege, the plaintiff had to prove that the privilege was abused by excessive
publication or used for purposes other than that of furthering the interest
which was entitled to protection. 0 Animus or actual malice on the part of the
defendant also could overcome the privilege defense.5 1
Two major obstacles decreased the likelihood of a subject recovering
damages from a credit reporting agency. First, credit reporting agencies oper-
ated in almost complete secrecy.5 2 Often they contractually obligated a user
not to disclose to the subject the source of its reports or even that it used
reports. 53 Consequently, the subject was unlikely to discover the existence of
the erroneous information at the root of his credit problems. Second, beginning
in the 1860's and extending into the early twentieth century, all but two
American jurisdictions54 adopted a qualified privilege for credit reporting
agencies in defamation suits.55
The rationale for the privilege was that the requirements of merchants for
accurate information would tend to maintain a generally high level of accu-
racy in the industry and that the extent of the occasional harm to credit appli-
cants was slight in comparison with the benefit accruing to commerce.56 Most
courts that recognize the qualified privilege have adopted this reasoning?5
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 795. The qualified privilege may be over-
come if abused "by excessive publication, by use of the occasion for an improper pur-
pose, or by lack of belief or grounds for belief in the truth of what is said." Id. at 796;
see note 46 supra.
51. See W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 792-96.
52. See Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Rem-
edy, 57 GEO. L.J. 509, 511-12 (1969); Note, supra note 19, at 1037.
53. Hearings on S.823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Sen. Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1969). Neither credit
reporting agencies nor users were obligated to notify the subject that a report existed or
that a report was the basis for denying credit, insurance, or employment. Id.; see Note,
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 819, 821-22 (1972).
54. Idaho and Georgia did not adopt the qualified privilege for credit reporting
agencies. Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Retail Credit Co. v. Russel, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54
(1975); Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25
Idaho 696, 704-05, 139 P. 1007, 1010 (1914).'
55. See cases collected in Note, supra note 19, at 1050 nn.86-87; see also Com-
ment, The Time of Discovery Rule and the Qualified Privilege Defense for Credit
Reporting Agencies in Illinois After World of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 10 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 359, 379-80 (1977).
56. Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies, 14 COLUM. L. REV.
187 (1914). Smith reasoned that the credit reporting agency performed services which,
if performed by the merchants' servants, would be privileged under the common law
privilege for communications made in the line of business duty. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 13, § 115(3), at 789.
57. See Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, 194 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952); H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241
F.2d 387, 393 (4th Cir. 1957); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 239, 201
A.2d 344, 345 (1964); Shore v. Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515,
1984]
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Some courts have reasoned that in applying for credit the applicant impliedly
consents to the use of credit reports.58
This qualified privilege almost immunizes the agencies to adverse judg-
ments because it is exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove malice. Courts
have differed on what conduct constitutes malice, but most have rejected sim-
ple negligence59 and have required proof of ill will, bad faith, or conscious or
reckless disregard for the truth or the rights of others.10 It is unlikely, how-
ever, that a credit reporting agency and its employees harbor ill will toward
the subject. Rather, the errors probably are the result of carelessness or inade-
quate procedures.
The agency establishes its procedures so as to provide information at a
privately optimal level of depth and accuracy. Except in the egregious case
where the agency's conduct does involve improper motives, the qualified privi-
lege confers nearly complete immunity from suit. Thus, Rubin's prediction re-
garding precedent is confirmed in the consumer credit reporting context. A
rule of liability developed that favored the party with a continuing interest in
cases of the same sort. In the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth
century, when the privilege was developed, large credit reporting agencies liti-
520, 174 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1961); Hartman & Co. v. Hyman & Lieberman, 287 Pa.
78, 83, 134 A. 486, 487-88 (1926); Barker v. Retail Credit Co., 8 Wis. 2d 664, 665,
100 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1960).
58. See, e.g., Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C.
1967).
59. ABC Needlecraft Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet. Inc., 245 F. 2d 775, 777 (2d
Cir. 1957); Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 158, 168, 302 N.E.2d 88,
95 (1973); Shore v. Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515, 522, 174
N.E.2d 376, 380-81 (1961). Since the FCRA was passed, some courts have been will-
ing to refine the standard of malice necessary to defeat the qualified privilege in cases
involving commercial credit. E.g., Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381
(7th Cir. 1972); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82
(1975); Krumholtz v. TRW, Inc., 142 N.J. Super. 80, 360 A.2d 413 (1976). Most
courts, however, have been unwilling to permit an action under a theory of negligence
where the effect could be to avoid a qualified defamation privilege, or to offer jury
instructions that recite the due care standards of malice. E.g., Anderson v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732, 736-39 (10th Cir. 1976). But see Pan Am. Bank of
Miami v. Osgood, 383 So..2d 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (negligence action allowed),
review denied, 392 So. 2d 1377 (1980).
60. ABC Needlecraft Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 245 F.2d 775, 777 (2d
Cir. 1957); H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387, 395 (4th Cir.
1957) ("[A]I definitions in substance come down to the equivalent of 'bad faith' ").
See generally Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in
Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REV. 865 (1931); Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69
HAxRv. L. REV. 875, 930 (1956) (collecting definitions of malice); Note, supra note 19,
at 1051 n.88. Attempts by defendants to impose a higher standard of malice under the
first amendment have failed. See Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 33 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026
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gated cases on essentially the same facts in many different jurisdictions. Sever-
al firms, such as the predecessor firms to Dun & Bradstreet, appeared repeat-
edly as defendants in cases that established the qualified immunity.61 It is
reasonable to assume that the firms, guided by counsel, selectively settled, liti-
gated, and appealed cases with a view toward developing favorable rules of
liability. 62
The parties did not represent symmetrically the future interests in dis-
putes of the same nature. The defendant preferred a particular rule of liability
in every case. The plaintiff then, as now, typically was an individual or a busi-
ness person seeking redress for a particular harm. Unlike the agencies, plain-
tiffs had no expectation of future litigation on the issue and no continuing
interest in the precedent established or advanced by the case. Consistent with
Rubin's theory, rules evolved to favor the credit reporting agencies, with no
predictable connection with efficiency.
If the agency acts without malice, a false negative credit report is an
"accident." Economic efficiency requires making the credit agency liable for
the accident when it is the most efficient accident-avoider.6 3 The qualified im-
munity that became embedded in American common law prevents this assign-
ment of liability and results in economic inefficiency. It imposes the full risk of
inaccurate negative information on the subject, the party least able to prevent
the error or to insure against it. The agency is free to disregard the costs to the
subjects in its decision to spend money on increasing accuracy. Thus, an eco-
nomically inefficient level of accuracy will result.
IV. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
The credit reporting industry and its subscribers were satisfied with their
status under the common law. The Fair Credit Reporting Act was an unwel-
come intrusion into their world. The circumstances surrounding the FCRA's
birth are interesting and well-documented. 4 Popular literature 5 of the 1960's
had catalogued the horrors of computerized data banks without drawing con-
gressional attention specifically to the credit reporting industry. In 1968, the
House Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy held hearings on a proposed gov-
ernment national data bank. 6 When the subcommittee became aware of the
61. E.g., Erber v. Dun, 12 F. 526 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1882); Mitchell v. Bradstreet
Co., 116 Mo. 226, 236-40, 22 S.W. 358, 360 (1893); see cases collected in Note, supra
note 19, at 1050 nn.86-87.
62. For a description of techniques available for influencing the development of
law through successive cases, see Galanter, supra, note 5, at 98-103.
63. See Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983).
64. See Note, The Fair redit Reporting Act, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 63, 67-70
(1979).
65. See, e.g., E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 48-63 (1966); V. PACKARD, THE NA-
KED SOCIETY 29-30, 168-206 (1964).
66. Hearings on Retail Credit Co. of Atlanta, Georgia, Before the Subcomm.
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extent of private computerized data banks, it called for further hearings on the
industry.
67
In preparation for these hearings, and at the behest of the subcommittee
chair, the credit reporting industry's trade association promulgated a set of
guidelines to govern its members. 8 Soon after these guidelines were submitted
to Congress, Senator William Proxmire introduced the first version of the
FCRA to the Senate.6 9 Over a year later, the bill emerged from the Senate
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions in a form quite different from
Proxmire's original bill. It was a product of compromise hammered out be-
tween the industry lobby and Senator Proxmire's staff.7 0 To protect the com-
promise from a more stringent version of the bill in the House,71 and at the
urging of the industry, Senator Proxmire added his bill as an amendment to a
popular bill.7 2 The House conferees, faced with the impending close of the
session, agreed to the bill and the FCRA was signed into law in October,
1970.
73
Although the FCRA was a compromise, it was identifiably a product of
the consumer movement of the 1960s.74 It is not surprising that the consumer
on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968). Between 1965 and 1971, congressional committees conducted several
investigations that involved the credit reporting industry. These hearings focused on the
threat to privacy rather than the risk of inaccuracy. See McLaughlin & Vaupel, Con-
stitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is
Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773, 784 n.60 (1975).
67. Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before the Special Subcomm. on
the Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968).
68. See Note, Judicial Construction of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: Scope
and Civil Liability, 76 COLum. L. REV. 458, 465 n.43 (1976).
69. S. 823, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 24902-04 (1968).
70. See A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 86-87 (1971); Comment, The Fair
Credit Reporting Act Amendments: Enforcement of the Legislative 'Trust'?, 45 Miss.
L.J. 95 (1974).
71. H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see Note, supra note 68, at 465
n.45.
72. 116 CONG. REc. 32639 (1970).
73. 83 Stat. 1127, 1136; see Note, supra note 68, at 465 n.47.
74. Perhaps, as Professor Rubin has suggested, it was a reduction of organiza-
tional costs. The revolution in technology and communication that made possible a
nationwide computerized credit reporting industry also may have lowered the cost bar-
riers to effective consumer organization and lobbying. Moreover, the ideological climate
emphasized the value of individual privacy and distrust of aggregation of wealth or
power.
The FRCA was accompanied by a series of judicial decisions in which courts indi-
cated an unwillingness to recognize the qualified privilege at all. These opinions ap-
peared in cases that involved either commercial credit rather than consumer credit or
in fact situations not covered by the FCRA. The opinions reflect a solicitude for the
helplessness of the victim and a sense of outrage at the inequity inflicted upon the
victim by the qualified privilege. One state appellate court declined to follow 1918 au-
thority for the privilege, stating, "Times change and principles of law change with
14
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lobbying groups turned to legislation to effect change. The common law rule
was far too entrenched to yield quickly and easily to strategic litigation. It is
in the nature of consumer groups that the focus of attention changes rapidly.
Consequently, the legislative arena became more attractive. Nor is it surpris-
ing that the credit reporting industry would embrace the opportunity to nego-
tiate the least objectionable statute. In the 1960's, the industry was transform-
ing into a modern electronic information network. With increasing economic
stakes and lower marginal costs of political organizing, it too may have recog-
nized and embraced the potential-and perhaps the inevitability-of change
through the legislative arena.
The FCRA redefined the standards for credit reporting agencies and the
rights of those who are subjects of credit reports."5 The Act gives the Federal
Trade Commission enforcement responsibility 6 but not the authority for issu-
ing regulations. 77 The Act also provides for criminal penalties78 and civil liabil-
ity7" for negligent and willful violations. The legislation reflects three broad
goals. First, it is designed to reduce secrecy in credit reporting by informing
them." Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 259 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972). Other courts noted the "apparent shift in emphasis" from protection of the
agency to the protection of the individual or business enterprise that was the subject of
a credit report. Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 32 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974). In rejecting the qualified privilege, the Georgia Supreme
Court refused to weight "the scales against the individual who stands alone facing a
commercial Goliath with the power to destroy-not necessarily through malice but per-
haps merely from carelessness-his credit rating, commercial advantages, insurance
protection and employment, all through the publication of erroneous reports concerning
affairs." Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 770, 218 S.E.2d 54, 58 (1975).
75. See generally Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819
(1972); Comment, The Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 50 N. CAR. L. REV.
852 (1972).
76. The Federal Trade Commission has the power to enforce the FCRA under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982), "except to the extent
that enforcement. . . is specifically committed to some other government agency." Id.
§ 168Is(a). A violation of the Act constitutes an unfair or deceptive act under § 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982), regardless of other
jurisdictional tests. Violation of the provisions and prohibitions of the FCRA consti-
tutes violation of various regulatory acts, with enforcement responsibility vested in the
respective agencies for activities subject to the agencies' control. Id. § 1681s(c).
77. The Federal Trade Commission is authorized to issue only procedural rules
and "to require the filing of reports, the production of documents, and the appearance
of witnesses" as under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)
(1982). The FTC has promulgated a compliance pamphlet. BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, Div. OF CONSUMER CREDIT AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS, FTC, COMPLIANCE
WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (2d rev. ed. 1977).
78. The criminal provisions forbid any "knowingly and willfully obtain[ing] in-
formation on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses," 15
U.S.C. § 1681q (1982), and "knowingly and willfully provid[ing] information concern-
ing an individual from the agency's files to a person not authorized to receive that
information." Id. § 1681r. Both provisions carry maximum penalties of a $5,000 fine or
not more than one year of imprisonment, or both.
79. See notes 89-90 infra.
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the consumer that a credit report about him or her exists.80 If a subscriber
requests an investigative report, the credit reporting agency must so inform the
consumer.81 If a subscriber denies credit or insurance to a consumer based on
adverse information in a credit report, the subscriber must inform the con-
sumer and give the consumer the name and address of the credit reporting
agency that provided the information.82 If a consumer is the subject of an
adverse credit or insurance decision, the agency must disclose to the consumer,
on request, the nature and substance of most of the information in the file.83
A second goal is to reduce the potential damage to the consumer by pro-
viding a means for the consumer to correct errors in the report. If the con-
sumer believes that information in the report is false or misleading, he may
require the agency to conduct another investigation.8 4 If the dispute continues
after reinvestigation, the consumer may file a statement of his view of the
facts in dispute, and the statement must be distributed in future reports to
users.85 In addition, the consumer may require that the agency send a notice
of the deletion or of the consumer statement to users who have received re-
ports containing the adverse material.8 6 These requirements assist the con-
sumer in satisfying himself or herself about the accuracy of information kept
by the credit reporting agency. While not empowered to change the data, the
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1982) defines the "consumer report" as:
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing
on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, a mode of living which is used or
expected to be used or collected . . . for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, or (2) employment
purposes.
See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D. Minn. 1976); Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F.
Supp. 1240 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781
(M.D. Fla. 1976). Although the FCRA defines "consumer" to mean "an individual,"
15 U.S.C. 1681a(c) (1982), the term "consumer" is used consistently in the Act to
refer to the subject of a "consumer report" or an "investigative consumer report." E.g.,
id. § 1681g(a)(1).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(1) (1982); see notes 18-19 supra. Investigative con-
sumer reports may not be procured or created unless written disclosure is given to the
subject. Id. § 1681d(a)(1)..The subject is entitled to receive "a complete and accurate
disclosure of the nature and scope of the investigation." Id. § 168ld(b). The consumer
is entitled to request disclosure of "the nature and substance of all information . . . in
its files on the consumer" and the names of recipients of that information. Id. § 1681g.
This provision has been held to include substantially all information in the agency's
possession. Heath v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 618 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir.
1980).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1982).
83. Id. § 1681g(a). The agency is not required to reveal medical information in
its files or the source of information acquired and used for preparing an investigative
consumer report. Id. § 1681g(a)(1), (2).
84. Id. § 1681i(a).
85. Id. § 1681i(b), (c).
86. Id. § 1681i(d).
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consumer is provided a means of counteracting the effect of negative informa-
tion, either by adding a personal statement to the file or by explaining the
negative information directly to a prospective creditor, insurer, or employer.
A third goal of the Act is to increase accuracy in consumer reports. The
Act requires the agency to create, maintain, and follow procedures that are
subject to a general standard of reasonability. Agencies must maintain reason-
able procedures designed to avoid reporting information that the Act deems
obsolete8 7 and to avoid furnishing consumer reports to ineligible recipients or
for impermissible purposes. 88 In addition, the Act establishes a general statu-
tory duty to "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accu-
racy" of information.89 If the agency negligently fails to comply with the Act,
it may be liable under section 1681o for actual damages resulting to the con-
sumer, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 90 If the failure to comply is will-
ful, the defendant is liable under section 1681n for actual damages, costs, at-
torneys' fees, and such punitive damages "as the court may allow." 91,
Read together, sections 168le(b), 1681n and 1681o create a cause of ac-
tion for negligent or willful, failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information. Cases interpreting these stat-
utes have established that the plaintiff may allege and prove: that the agency's
procedures, however reasonably calculated to assure accuracy, were not fol-
87. The FCRA forbids inclusion of certain information in a credit report unless
the report is to be used in connection with a credit or life insurance transaction involv-
ing principal or face amount of more than $50,000 or employment at a salary that
exceeds $20,000 per year. The information includes bankruptcies more than 10 years
old; suits and judgments, paid tax liens, and accounts placed for collection more than
seven years old; and most adverse items of information that antedate the report by
more than seven years. Id. § 1681c. The duty to maintain reasonable procedures
designed to avoid reporting obsolete information is imposed by id. § 1681e.
88. Id. §§ 1681(c), 1681e(a). The agency must maintain reasonable procedures
designed to limit furnishing of consumer reports to use of the report in connection with
a credit transaction with the subject of the report, employment, underwriting of insur-
ance, a determination of eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by government,
and other business transactions involving the subject. Id. §§ 1681b(3), 1681e(a). The
report may be released to a court having jurisdiction or on written instructions of the
subject. Id. § 168 1b(1); see In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009-10 (E.D. Mich.
1978).
89. The reporting agency "shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maxi-
mum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1982).
90. Id. § 1681o provides:
Any consumer reporting agency or user of information which is negligent
in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with
respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the
sum of- (1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of
the failure; (2) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability
under the section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's
fees as determined by the court.
91. Id. § 1681n.
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lowed with respect to a particular individual; 9 or that given the seriousness of
the resulting harm, the agency's procedures were not reasonably calculated to
assure sufficient accuracy.9 3
The Act provides the foundation for a statutory negligence action that
replaces state actions in defamation.9 4 To a limited extent, the consumer still
may redress his injury through common law actions in defamation. If the re-
port that injured the subject has been obtained pursuant to the disclosure pro-
visions95 of the Act, state law actions in negligence, privacy, and defamation
are precluded, except where the information is false and is furnished with mal-
ice or willful intent to injure.9 6 Since most injuries to credit report subjects
result from mistake or accident, state law actions will be unavailable. The
statutory immunity from state law actions does not apply where the consumer
has not requested the information through the FCRA.97 Usually, however,
that is the only way the consumer can gain access to the the file. Conse-
quently. the Act effectively bars state actions in defamation and substitutes a
statutory negligence action.
V. CONCLUSION
Through the FCRA negligence action, Congress relegated to the courts
the task of further developing the industry's legal duty to subjects. In the judi-
cial arena, however, the interests of the parties continue to be asymmetric.
Typically, the defendant is a major firm in the credit industry. The plaintiff is
an injured consumer who has no ongoing interest in the case as precedent.
Evolutionary theory suggests that there will be no predictable development of
the legal rules toward efficiency; the rules will develop so as to favor the indus-
try, the party with the ongoing interest.98 Development of the rules, however,
will be constrained by the language and purposes of the Act. The Act sets
92. See Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833-34 (8th Cir.
1976).
93. See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-43 (E.D. Mich. 1980),
affd, 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982).
94. For a comparison of the treatment of consumer injury in credit reporting
under the common law and the FCRA, see Maurer, supra note 14, at 72.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1982); see notes 81-83 and accompanying text
supra.
96. Id. § 1681h(e) provides:
Except as provided in sections 1681n and 16810 of this title, no consumer
may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of
privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any
consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who fur-
nishes information to a consumer reporting agency, based on information dis-
closed pursuant to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, except as to
false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such
consumer.
97. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 772, 218 S.E.2d 54, 59 (1975).
98. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
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minimum duties for the industry99 and presents a clear statement of legislative
purpose to guide the courts.1"0 The statute, therefore, erects a barrier to the
industry's achieving favorable rules through litigation and limits the industry's
options in litigation.101 The industry defendant may selectively settle and liti-
gate cases that involve statutory interpretation or the standards of duty in the
negligence action. Presumably, firms do that to the extent that it is feasible.
Alternatively, the defendant may attack the statute using collateral legal prin-
ciples, as the firms in the industry have done with some success using the first
amendment.10 2 On balance, however, the appellate cases under section
1681e(b) 10 3 have tended to define high standards of liability for the industry.
Under the common law, the interests of a credit reporting agency and the
subject of one of its reports were asymmetric. The agency had a continuing
interest in the outcome, while the subject was only concerned about the instant
case. The common law evolved in favor of the credit reporting agency. The
rule of liability that emerged was economically inefficient. When the issue of
report accuracy and standards of care entered the legislative arena, the inter-
ests of both groups were represented symmetrically. As Rubin has pointed out,
there is no a priori reason why statutes that are the product of legislative
lobbying by interest groups should be any more or less efficient than common
law litigation.104 No doubt, the credit reporting industry would have preferred
the status quo-a qualified privilege to defame, which insulated the industry
from successful attack. At the other extreme, consumer groups would have
preferred a standard of strict liability, which would have been economically
99. See notes 80-89 and accompanying text supra.
100. The statement of congressional findings under the Act recites the "need to
insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fair-
ness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy." 15 U.S.C. §
1681a(4) (1982). The legislative purpose of the Act is that "consumer reporting agen-
cies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equi-
table to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, the
proper utilization of such information." Id. § 1681b.
101. The industry's litigation options will be limited in the sense that agencies
may not challenge the reasonability of a defendant's action where that action violates
the substantive legislative standard. In a civil action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o or §
1681n, the defendant may claim that its failure to achieve the substantive legislative
standard was not negligent.
102. See, e.g., Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980) (invali-
dated under the first amendment sections of the Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act that
are similar to provisions of the federal FCRA), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); see
also Maurer, supra note 14, at 105-11; Comment, The New Commercial Speech and
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 131 (1981). A current case, Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d. 414, cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 389 (1983) poses the issue of whether a commercial credit reporting agency
is entitled to the protection of the first amendment.
103. See, e.g., Heath v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 618 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.
1980).
104. Rubin, supra note 5, at 218.
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efficient. The compromise was the FCRA negligence standard.
A standard of strict liability would be socially optimal. In the context of
the FCRA, however, the negligence rule may be nearly as good. First, those
who are injured by a false negative report can correct the error. They must be
informed of the basis for adverse decisions on credit or insurance and provided
with the source of the credit report. The FCRA provides the basis for cor-
recting entries in the file. As a result, this sort of mistake is different from
most products liability accidents. To some extent, the victim can undo the ac-
cident and restore the status quo. This is not to say that there is no cost to
being denied credit or insurance temporarily, but it is not the same cost as
that imposed under the common law.
The FCRA has the effect of structuring the conduct of the credit report-
ing agencies and the subjects. The agencies must develop procedures that will
minimize the likelihood of injury. Accidents will continue to occur because the
optimal degree of accuracy will not lead to zero accidents. When accidents
occur, however, the subject has a means to report it and get the error cor-
rected. In time, the case law may impose a duty to mitigate damages on the
subjects, which will serve to reduce current and future losses.
The history of the law governing accidents in consumer credit reporting
lends weight to the evolutionary theory that there is no a priori reason why
statutes that are the product of legislative lobbying by interest groups should
be any more or less efficient than common law litigation. In either event, effi-
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